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Abstract
This paper analyzes the e¤ect of globalization on wage premia by studying the interaction
between trade costs, …rms’ location decision, and relative demand for labor. It suggests
that globalization, through vertical specialization and/or agglomeration, increases inequality
in countries with a relative abundance of skilled workers in a way that is observationally
equivalent to skilled-biased technological progress (i.e., joint increases in the wage premium
and the within-industry skilled–unskilled employment ratio). This con…rms the potential role
of international trade in explaining the observed increase in wage inequality between skilled
and unskilled workers that has occurred in most industrialized countries since the mid-
1970s. Calibration of the model supports this result. It shows that NAFTA has contributed
signi…cantly to the observed increase in the U.S. wage premium.
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1. Introduction
In the last twenty years, most OECD countries have seen a large increase in the ratio of
skilled to unskilled wages (i.e., the wage premium) and/or in the share of skilled workers in
employment (see Figure 1). In Europe and North America, where economic integration is far
along, the increased inequality between skilled and unskilled has further fueled the debate as to
the bene…ts of integration (e.g., the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was one
of the most controversial issues of the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign and has also become one
of the most important arguments against the 1992 Maastrich treaty). Whereas a popular belief
is that increased international trade is to a large extent responsible for the growth in inequality,
economists are divided over the source of the labor demand shift. Two explanations have
dominated the debate. One is that the rapid di¤usion of information technologies, computers,
and new forms of work organization have biased production techniques toward skilled workers.1
The other is that increased import competition from low-wage countries has shifted resources
toward industries that are relatively more skilled-intensive. The reluctance to assign trade a
major role stands on two main arguments. First, most authors argue that trade volumes with
low-wage countries are too small to generate the observed increase in wage inequality. Second,
standard theory predicts that an increase in the relative price of skilled labor should increase the
within-industry relative employment of unskilled workers.2 But, as shown by various authors,
the growth in inequality has been accompanied primarily by a within-industry shift in relative
demand away from unskilled workers.3 Therefore, economists have generally concluded that
trade must play a small role in generating the recent increase in inequality.
Most studies to date, however, have focused on trade in …nal goods. Considering trade in
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intermediate goods and looking at trade from a di¤erent angle than import competition may help
us reconcile fact and theory. A fall in the cost of trade (e.g., lower tari¤s, transportation costs, or
information/communication costs) may indeed encourage the delinking of stages of production
and so lead to the development of trade in intermediate goods, components, parts, or work in
progress between production units in di¤erent countries. International trade may hence become
increasingly vertically specialized.4 Because vertical specialization splits the production chain
across countries, the unskilled-intensive stages within manufacturing industries shift to low-
(unskilled) wage countries and consequently the wage premium and the within-industry ratio of
skilled to unskilled workers rises in skilled-abundant countries. When …rms are linked through an
input–output structure, globalization may also generate agglomeration– that is, the clustering of
economic activity in one location. This would occur as a result of di¤erent stages of production
within a given industry locating close to each other in order to take advantage of increased
competitiveness and greater demand.5 If these stages di¤er in their mix of labor factors, then
agglomeration shifts the relative within-industry demand for skilled versus unskilled workers.
Under certain conditions, it also results in both an increased wage premium and an increased
within-industry ratio of skilled to unskilled workers.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of globalization on inequality and, more
speci…cally, to present a trade explanation of the observed joint increase in the wage premium
and the within-industry share of skilled workers. In order to do so, I look at the interaction
between trade costs, …rms’ location decision, and the relative demand for labor. This paper
develops a general equilibrium model that endogenously determines the equilibrium structure
of production (vertical specialization or agglomeration) and wage premia. It addresses the
following questions: When does vertical specialization occur? In which countries and under what
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conditions does agglomeration take place? How does globalization a¤ect the wage premium, in
di¤erent locations? By considering trade in intermediate inputs and …rms’ location decisions
can we reconcile facts and theory? In the last part of the paper I evaluate, through calibration
of the model, the potential impact of NAFTA in explaining the observed increased in the U.S.
wage premium.
Two bodies of literature are related to this work. The …rst one, gathered under the name
of ”new economic geography” studies …rms’ location decision. It analyzes whether and why
industrial activity tends to cluster in speci…c locations and hence provides insight concerning
the e¤ects that a decrease in trade costs may have on structures of production. It also helps
us understand how cross-national income gaps form and decline as trade costs vary.6 Although
recent empirical evidence (e.g., Davis and Weinstein 1998, Torstensson 1997) seem to support
the relevance both of agglomeration e¤ects and of comparative advantage in a¤ecting trade and
production patterns, the economic geography literature considers two symmetrical countries and
hence neglects the comparative advantage channel. It also fails to provide a trade explanation
of within-country increases in inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
The second body is the profuse literature on the potential role of trade in explaining the
increased inequality within industrialized countries. Closely related to the present work is Feen-
stra and Hanson (1996), which use an Hecksher–Ohlin type of model and study how reallocation
of production across countries (caused by exogenous reallocation of capital) a¤ects the wage
premium. They point out that increased outsourcing (vertical specialization) generates within-
industry skill upgrading. In subsequent papers (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1996, 1997), the
authors estimate the impact of outsourcing on wages. This paper signi…cantly extends their
results by studying the case of trade in di¤erentiated products and allowing for agglomeration.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the formal model ; Section 3, the equilib-
rium. Sections 4–6 analyze …rms’ location decision for di¤erent levels of trade costs, as well as
the induced e¤ects on wage premia. Section 7 presents simulations of the model and discussions.
Section 8 calibrates the model using U.S. and Mexican data, and Section 9 concludes. (Section
10 comprises Appendices.)
2. The Model
I use a new economic geography model (à la Krugman and Venables 1995) in which I intro-
duce two factors of production. This enables me to examine the location decisions of vertically
linked …rms when the upstream and downstream sectors di¤er in factor intensity and countries
di¤er in endowments of labor factor. Thus I analyze the e¤ect of globalization on asymmet-
ric countries and derive conclusions regarding the wage premium. Note that, in an independent
work, Amiti (2001) uses a similar framework. However, she focuses on the …rm’s location pattern
whereas I analyze the implication of globalization on skilled–unskilled wage inequality:
Consider two countries (home and foreign), two imperfectly competitive industries (or stages
of production) that are linked through an input–output structure and an agricultural sector.7
Firms in the upstream industry produce intermediate goods with production function
xui = Fi(L);
where xui is the production of intermediate good i (the subscript u stands for upstream) and L
represents unskilled labor. Firms in the downstream industry produce …nal goods with produc-
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tion function
xdi = Gi(H;Cu);
where xdi is the production of …nal good i (the subscript d stands for downstream), H represents
skilled labor, and Cu represents a composite good made up of varieties of upstream (intermediate)
goods, as will be seen later in the model.8
As is standard in trade models labor is assumed to be immobile across countries, the home
and foreign countries face the same technology, and consumers in home and foreign have iden-
tical homothetic preferences over a composite good made up of varieties of downstream (…nal)
goods and an agricultural good. The assumption of homotheticity permits separation of the
consumption decision into two stages: (i) the allocation of expenditure between the agricultural
good and manufactured goods, and (ii) suballocation of manufaturing expenditure among vari-
eties. The agricultural good is assumed to be freely tradeable and its price is used as numeraire.
There is trade in both intermediate and …nal goods. I also make the assumptions
¹H > ¹H¤ and ¹L < ¹L¤;
where ¹H is the endowment in skilled labor, ¹L is the endowment in unskilled labor, and variables
with a * superscript correspond to foreign variables. These assumptions are speci…c to this
model.
Within this framework, three forces in‡uence a …rm’s production location choice: vertical
(cost and demand) linkages, factor prices, and access to market. Vertical linkages increase the
pro…tability of …rms producing in the same location. Firms that use intermediate inputs …nd
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it pro…table to locate close to …rms that produce these inputs, since the price of intermediate
inputs is lower in such a location. This is the cost linkage. Firms that produce intermediate
inputs …nd it pro…table to locate where there is high demand for their goods. This is the
demand linkage. Vertical linkage forces are standard in the economic geography literature, and
if strong enough they give rise to agglomeration of the industrial production in one location.
On the other hand, two considerations play against agglomeration: immobility of …nal demand;
and di¤erences in indowments (and hence prices) of labor factors. Whether agglomeration or
vertical specialization takes place depends on the relative magnitudes of these forces, which in
turn depend on the level of trade costs.
Next I specify the equations of the model for the home country. Symmetric equations hold
for the foreign country.
2.1. Preferences
Consumers have Cobb–Douglas preferences over the agricultural good and the manufactured
good. Their utility is
U = C1¡°A C
°
d ; (2.1)
where CA is the demand for agricultural good (with price used as numeraire; i.e., pA = 1): Here
Cd is the demand for a variety of …nal goods ; it represents a composite good made up of variety
of …nal downstream goods. Consumers have identical preferences among varieties of the …nal
(downstream) good, which take the form of a “constant elasticity of substitution” subutility
function of the Dixit–Stiglitz–Spence type. Hence
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Cd =
24 ndX
i
c
¾¡1
¾
di +
n¤dX
j
(mdj)
¾¡1
¾
35 ¾¾¡1 ;
where cdi is the demand in the home country for downstream good i produced domestically
and mdj is the home demand for downstream good j produced abroad ; nd (resp., n¤d) is the
number of downstream …rms located in the home (resp., foreign) country. We refer to Cd as the
aggregate downstream good.
Shipment of the manufactured goods incurs \iceberg” trade costs. That is, in order to deliver
one unit of any good from one country to another, ¿ > 1 units must be shipped because only
a fraction 1/¿ arrives; 1-1=¿ melts in transit. The manufacturing price index of the aggregate
downstream good, Pd; is hence de…ned by
Pd =
24 ndX
i
p1¡¾di +
n¤dX
j
(p¤dj¿d)1¡¾
35 11¡¾ ;
where pdi is the producer price of downstream good i:
2.2. Agriculture
The agricultural sector is perfectly competitive and produces an homogenous good, xA,
that is assumed to be costlessly tradeable. Since the agricultural good’s price is the same in
both countries, I choose it as numeraire. Note that xA is produced using unskilled labor and
arable land, R; with constant returns to scale. Here R is a speci…c factor used only in the xA
industry ; it acts partly to ”convexify” the model. As the manufactured sector expands, it draws
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unskilled labor from the agricultural sector. This raises the R=LA ratio and thereby the cost
of unskilled labor measured in terms of xA. Since the purpose of this paper is to study …rms’
location decisions when countries di¤er in labor endowments and the resulting skilled–unskilled
inequality, I assume that countries are otherwise similar and hence that R = R¤: The production
function is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form so that
xA = (LA)±R1¡±; (2.2)
where LA denotes agricultural employment.
2.3. Firms
The manufacturing sector is monopolistically competitive (à la Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) and
is composed of two industries or stages that are vertically linked through an input–output
structure. At each stage, di¤erentiated goods are produced under increasing returns to scale.
Following Dixit and Stiglitz, we assume that production of a quantity xhi of any variety i in any
stage h requires the same …xed (®) and variable (¯xhi) quantities of inputs.
The upstream industry uses only unskilled labor, L, as input. Therefore,
Li = ® + ¯xui: (2.3)
Then an upstream …rm, producing quantity xui of variety i; has a total cost function of
TCui = wL(®+ ¯xui);
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where wL denotes the price of unskilled labor.
Downstream …rms feature a production function de…ned over skilled labor, H, and a compos-
ite good Cu made up of varieties of upstream goods. Following Ethier (1982), upstream goods
contribute in a symmetric fashion to the production of a downstream good with a constant
elasticity of substitution ¾ > 1 across varieties. Cu is de…ned by
Cu =
24 nuX
i
c
¾¡1
¾
ui +
n¤uX
j
(muj)
¾¡1
¾
35 ¾¾¡1 ;
where cui is the demand (summed over all domestic downstream …rms) for upstream good i
produced domestically and muj is the total home demand for upstream good j produced abroad;
nu (resp., n¤u) is the number of upstream …rms located in the home (resp., foreign) country. We
will refer to Cu as the aggregate upstream good. The input used by the downstream industry
is a Cobb–Douglas composite of (a) skilled labor H with share 1 ¡ ¹ and (b) the aggregate
upstream good Cu with share ¹. We thus have
H1¡¹i C
¹
ui = ® +¯xdi: (2.4)
The share ¹ of the intermediate input in production is a key parameter because it represents
the vertical linkages between the two sectors. The higher is ¹; the more upstream goods are
used in production of a downstream good and hence the stronger are forces that in‡uence
downstream and upstream …rms to locate close to each other.9 The manufacturing price index
of the aggregate upstream good, Pu; is de…ned by:
Pu =
24 nuX
i
p1¡¾ui +
n¤uX
j
(p¤uj¿u)1¡¾
35 11¡¾ ;
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where pui is the producer price of upstream good i. Therefore, a downstream …rm producing
quantity xdi of variety i has a total cost function of
TCdi = w
1¡¹
H P
¹
u (® +¯xdi);
where wH denotes the price of skilled labor.
I assume that there is free entry and exit at both stages. With a large number of symmetric
…rms in each stage, in equilibrium each …rm’s pro…t is driven to zero.
3. Solving for the Equilibrium
I solve for the equilibrium by considering the optimization problems of the consumers, down-
stream …rms, and upstream …rms in turn and then clearing the product and labor markets. First,
I compute consumers’ demand for …nal goods. Second, solving for the upstream and downstream
…rms, pro…t maximization, I obtain producers’ prices as well as their demand for labor and for
intermediate inputs. Then, using the condition of free entry and exit, I derive the output re-
quired for each …rm to break even. Finally, after clearing markets, I derive the equilibrium
conditions that simultaneously yield, for each country, the number of …rms in each stage and
the associated equilibrium of skilled and unskilled wages.
3.1. Consumer Demand for Final Goods
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Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraints. Given homothetic prefer-
ences, this problem is equivalent to maximizing a representative consumer’s utility where the
consumer’s income, I, is the sum of labor income and landowner income within a country.
Using Roy’s identity on the indirect utility function V = P¡°d I and recalling that the price of
the agricultural good equals unity, we obtain cdi, the consumer demand for …nal good i produced
at home, as well as mdj , the consumer demand for …nal good j produced abroad:
cdi = °IP¾¡1d p¡¾di ; (3.1)
mdj = °IP ¾¡1d (p
¤
dj)
¡¾¿1¡¾d : (3.2)
3.2. Agricultural Sector Demand for Factors
In the agricultural sector, producers choose LA and R that maximize pro…t. Since the sector
is perfectly competitive, the pro…t is zero. Landowners receive positive returns de…ned by rR,
where r is the price of land: Using (2:2), and normalizing R to 1, the …rst-order conditions are:
LA =
µ ±
wL
¶ 1
1¡±
(3.3)
r = (1 ¡ ±)
µ
±
wL
¶ ±
1¡±
: (3.4)
3.3. Downstream Price, Quantity, and Factor Demand
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A downstream …rm i chooses a quantity xdi to maximize its pro…t, taking other …rms,
quantities as given. Each …rm produces a distinct variety, since a …rm always does better by
introducing a new product variety than by sharing in the production of an existing one. The
…rst-order condition equating marginal revenue to marginal cost yields
pdi = P¹u w
1¡¹
H ¯
µ
¾
¾ ¡ 1
¶
; (3.5)
so that the price is a constant mark-up over marginal cost. (To derive this result, note that the
price elasticity of demand is equal to the consumer elasticity of substitution between varieties).
Because each …rm has the same technology, all downstream …rms within a country set the
same price and so the i subscript can be dropped. Substituting the pro…t-maximizing price back
into the pro…t equation yields
¼di = P¹uw
1¡¹
H ¯
µ
1
¾ ¡ 1
¶ µ
xdi ¡ ®(¾ ¡ 1)¯
¶
:
The demand for each variety depends negatively on the number of varieties produced (the more
varieties, the lower the index price and therefore the smaller the demand for each variety). Hence,
in equilibrium the number of varieties produced is such that each …rm breaks even. Using the
condition of free entry and exit and setting pro…t equal to zero determines the quantity of output
at which a …rm breaks even:
xdi =
®(¾ ¡ 1)
¯
: (3.6)
The equilibrium quantity produced is constant and is independent of its price, factor prices,
and the number of …rms. It is the same across …rms, so the i subscript can be dropped. This is
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a well-known consequence of Dixit–Stiglitz preferences and constant elasticity of substitution.
The downstream …rm’s demand for labor and intermediate goods is obtained by cost mini-
mization. Using Shephard’s lemma, we obtain a downstream …rm’s demand for upstream goods
produced at home and abroad and for skilled labor. Then, imposing the zero-pro…t condition
yields the total demand by downstream …rms for upstream good i produced at home for upstream
good j produced abroad, and for skilled labor H; as follows:
cui = ¹ndpdxdP¾¡1u p¡¾ui ; (3.7)
muj = ¹ndpdxdP¾¡1u (p¤uj)¡¾¿1¡¾u ; (3.8)
H = (1 ¡¹)ndpdxd
wH
: (3.9)
3.4. Upstream Price, Quantity, and Factor Demand
Upstream …rms face the same optimization problem as downstream …rms. The upstream
…rm i chooses xui to maximize its pro…t, implying that
pui = wL¯
µ ¾
¾ ¡ 1
¶
(3.10)
In equilibrium, free entry and exit yield
xui =
®(¾ ¡ 1)
¯
: (3.11)
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The maximizing price and the equilibrium quantity produced are constant and the same across
…rms, so the i subscript can be dropped.
Upstream …rms choose unskilled labor to minimize cost. Total home demand for unskilled
labor, L; is
L = nupuxu
wL
: (3.12)
3.5. Market-Clearing Conditions
Product market equilibrium requires demand to equal supply for each good in each manu-
facturing industry and for the agricultural good. For simplicity, as traditional in the literature,
units of measurement are chosen such that ¯ = ®(¾ ¡ 1). This implies xu = xd = 1. Moreover,
xh = ch +m¤h for h = u
and xA+ x¤A = cA + c¤A:
Labor market equilibrium requires that demand equal supply for each type of labor:
¹H = H and ¹L = L + LA:
3.6. The General Equilibrium
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Using the products and factors market conditions and the free-entry and market-clearing
conditions for home and foreign, we can solve for the equilibrium number of …rms, wages, and
prices.
For each value of trade costs ¿; there is an equilibrium level of nu, n¤u; nd, n¤d; wL; w¤L; wH ;
and w¤H . In the following sections, I study how these equilibrium values change as trade costs
decrease. I analyze the autarkic situation (¿ = 1) the free-trade situation (low ¿), and the
”intermediate trade cost” situation for any ¿ in between.
4. The Autarkic Equilibrium
If trade costs are in…nite then countries do not trade; this is the autarkic equilibrium. At
high but …nite trade costs, there is some trade but it is highly expensive to ship intermediate and
…nal goods from one country to the other and hence there is a positive number of both upstream
and downstream …rms in each country. This is the quasi-autarkic situation. I …rst show that the
autarkic equilibrium exists. Since autarky will be used as benchmark in the rest of the paper, I
then compute the relative number of …rms and wage premia for autarkic equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. As ¿ tends to in…nity; autarky is the unique equlibrium.
Proof. Note that, for ¿ ! 1; the price of a foreign good ¿ph (h = d;u:) becomes in…nite.
Thus, countries no longer trade and we have Pd = n
1
1¡¾
d pd and Pu = n
1
1¡¾
u pu:
In equilibrium, the quantity produced is constant and similar across varieties. Given the
production functions, this implies that each …rm of the same type (upstream or downstream)
uses a constant and similar quantity of input. As a result, the quantity of unskilled labor
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employed in the upstream sector in equilibrium is L = nuLi = nu®¾. Similarly, the equilibrium
quantity of skilled labor employed in the downstream sector is H = ndHi = nd (®¾C¹ui)
1=(1¡¹) :10
Also, in autarky, Cui = n
¾=(¾¡1)
u (1=nd).11 Using these expressions and their foreign equivalents
yields the relative number (home to foreign) of upstream and downstream …rms in autarkic
equilibrium:
nu
n¤u
= L
L¤ and
nd
n¤d
=
µ
H
H¤
¶1¡¹ µ L
L¤
¶ ¾¹
¾¡1
:
Now, applying the equilibrium condition that wage equals marginal productivity of labor in both
the agricultural and the downstream goods sectors, using the autarkic expressions for relative
downstream price, and then substituting, I obtain the equilibrium relative wages:
w
w¤ =
µL¤A
LA
¶1¡±
and
v
v¤ =
H¤
H
L
L¤
µL¤A
LA
¶1¡±
:
Proposition 4.2. The share of unskilled labor endowment used in agriculture is the same in
both the home country and the foreign country. That is, L¤A=L = L¤A=L¤.
Proof. . See Appendix 1.
Using Proposition 4.2 and the skilled labor market-clearing condition (i.e., ¹H = H = ndHi)
yields the autarkic equilibrium relative wages and numbers of …rms in term of relative labor
endowments:
w
w¤ =
Ã
¹L¤
¹L
!1¡±
; v
v¤ =
Ã
¹H¤
¹H
! Ã
¹L
¹L¤
!±
; nu
n¤u
=
¹L
¹L¤
; nd
n¤d
=
Ã
¹H
¹H¤
!1¡¹Ã ¹L
¹L¤
! ¾¹
¾¡1
:
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In autarkic equilibrium, relative-factors prices mirror relative-factors endowments. The un-
skilled wage is higher in the home country whereas the skilled wage is higher in the foreign
country and hence the foreign country is more unequal (i.e., has a higher wage premium, re-
call that: ¹L < ¹L¤ and ¹H > ¹H¤). The relative number of upstream …rms corresponds to the
relative unskilled labor endowment. More upstream …rms locate where unskilled labor is more
abundant– that is, where it is cheaper. The autarkic relative number of downstream …rms de-
pends on (a) the relative skilled labor endowment (up to the share at which skilled labor enters
…nal goods’ production) and on (b) the relative unskilled labor endowment (up to the share
at which unskilled labor– through the relative price of intermediate goods– enters …nal goods’
production). Note that the ratio of home to foreign downstream …rms is increasing in relative
skilled labor endowment (or in relative skilled wage) and decreasing in relative unskilled labor
endowment (or in relative intermediate goods price).
5. The Vertical Specialization Equilibrium: Low Trade Costs
At low trade costs, access to market (i.e., being close to the demand for …nal goods) and
vertical linkages in‡uence only partially the …rm’s location decision. The price of the immobile
factors is the force that matters. Because downstream and upstream …rms di¤er with respect
to intensify of labor factors, stages of production tend to locate in di¤erent countries; that is
vertical specialization occurs. Variations in the number of …rms shift labor demand and hence
modify wages. In equilibrium, wages are such that a marginal …rm does not …nd it pro…table
to relocate. It is interesting, that, in the home country, the wage premium and the within-
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industry skilled–unskilled employment ratio move in tandem– in line with empirical evidence.
This corroborates the potential role of international trade in explaining the within-industry
increase in inequality observed in most industrialized countries.
I …rst show how free-trade equilibrium numbers of …rms di¤er from their autarkic counter-
parts and analyze the induced consequences on the labor market. I then discuss similar issues
for low levels of trade costs. For clarity, it is useful to de…ne the following ratios (in what follows,
the superscript a denotes autarkic variables):
ªL =
wL
w¤L
; ªH =
wH
w¤H
; Nu =
nu
n¤u
; Nd =
nd
n¤d
,
¦ =
µ
Pu
P¤u
¶
=
Ã
Nuª1¡¾L + ¿1¡¾
Nuª1¡¾L ¿1¡¾ +1
! 1
1¡¾
:
If trade incurs no costs, then demand-side considerations do not in‡uence …rms’ location
decisions. Firms …nd it pro…table to locate where their production costs are lowest. Since the
foreign country has abundant unskilled labor, its autarkic unskilled wage is relatively lower.
Thus, with free trade, upstream …rms have an incentive to locate in the foreign country.
Proposition 5.1. In an interior equilibrium, the relative number of upstream …rms (home to
foreign) is lower under free trade than under autarky, i.e.; Nu < Nau:
Proof. In an interior equilibrium (in which there is production of upstream and downstream
goods in both countries), at ¿ = 1; it must be true that wL = w¤L; for if not then at least one
upstream …rm would …nd it pro…table to relocate. By assumption, R = R¤and thus the marginal
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productivity of labor is the same in the home country as in the foreign country. This implies that
the same number of unskilled workers is employed in the agricultural sector in both countries
: LA = L¤A. In autarky, nau=n¤au = ¹L=¹L¤; in free trade, nu=n¤u = L=L¤ = (L ¡ LA)=(L¤¡ L¤A)
Recalling that ¹L¤ > ¹L; the proposition follows.
Similarly, since the home country has abundant skilled labor, its autarkic skilled wage is
relatively lower. Since upstream goods are shipped at no cost, under free trade the downstream
…rms have an incentive to locate in the home country.
Proposition 5.2. In an interior equilibrium, the relative number of downstream …rms (home
to foreign) is higher under free trade, than under autarky ; i.e., Nd > N ad :
Proof. In an interior equilibrium, it must be true that downstream …rms’ production costs
at ¿ = 1; are equal across countries; if this were not the case then at least one downstream
…rm would …nd it pro…table to relocate. Downstream …rms use skilled labor and intermediate
goods as factors of production. Free trade guarantees that the price of the upstream good is
the same in both locations, which implies that wH = w¤H: The skilled labor demand equation
(3.9) implies that ndpd= ¹H = n¤dp¤d= ¹H¤. Free trade likewise guarantees that the price of the
downstream good is the same in both locations and so, under free trade, nd=n¤d = ¹H= ¹H¤: In
autarky, nad=n
¤a
d = (¹L=¹L
¤)¾¹=(¾¡1)( ¹H= ¹H¤)1¡¹. Since ¹H > ¹H¤and ¹L¤ > ¹L; the proposition
follows.
Thus, relatively more upstream (downstream) …rms locate in the foreign (home) country un-
der free trade than under autarky. The foreign country specializes in the production of upstream
goods whereas the home country specializes in the production of downstream goods. Di¤erent
stages of the production process locate in di¤erent countries, so there is vertical specialization.
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Owing to specialization and gain from trade, the number of downstream …rms in the home
country is higher under free trade than under autarky. Simulations of the model con…rm that the
contrary is true of the number of upstream …rms.12 Changes in the number of …rms translate to
wages and, as a result, the home wage premium is higher under vertical specialization than under
autarky. Proposition 5.3 shows that, in the home country, the within-industry skilled–unskilled
employment ratio is also higher under free trade than under autarky.
Proposition 5.3. If the free-trade number of home upstream …rms is lower than the autarkic
one, then the home-country ratio of skilled to unskilled workers is higher under free trade than
under autarky. That is, > H=L > Ha=La:
Proof. There is full employment of skilled labor in the downstream sector. Hence,
H = Ha = ¹H: If nu < nau, then L < La (recall that there is a one-to-one relationship between
number of upstream …rms and level of unskilled workers employed in the upstream sector). The
proposition follows.13
Whereas empirical evidence supports this co-movement, it is at odds with a Stolper–Samuelson
type of explanation of the increase in skilled–unskilled worker inequality (as mentioned earlier,
traditional trade theory posits that the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers decreases within
industry). Most studies to date have therefore concluded that international trade plays a lim-
ited role in explaining the increased inequality and have argued for skilled-biased technological
progress as the most likely culprit. However, under vertical specialization, labor demand shifts
along the production chain in a way that is observationally equivalent to a labor shift induced by
skilled-biased technological changes. The “vertical specialization” story thus provides an alter-
native explanation for the joint occurrence of the wage premium increase and the within-industry
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share of skilled workers increase. Hence international trade, through vertical specialization, may
be an important cause of the increased inequality observed in most industrialized countries.
In the foreign country, the wage premium is lower under free trade than under autarky. This
result, although in line with standard Hecksher–Ohlin theory, is counterfactual in that most
developing countries undergo an increase in wage inequality.14 Note, however, that the present
paper does not aim to provide an explanation for all wage premium variations in all countries but
rather to explain part of the increase in wage premium in countries with abundant skilled labor.
Skilled-biased technological progress, which undoubtedly plays a role in explaining increased
wage premia, may have a dominant e¤ect in developing countries or in those with an abundance
of unskilled labor. In fact, in developing countries, skilled-biased technological progress may
result from trade with, foreign direct investment in, and transnational …rms relocating from
industrialized countries. Discussing such arguments is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
Next, we analyze an equilibrium characterized by low trade costs. Let ªaL denote the autarkic
equilibrium relative unskilled wage.
Proposition 5.4. For any trade-cost levels such that ªaL > ¿; upstream …rms have an incentive
to locate in the foreign country.
Proof. Upstream …rms decide to locate in the foreign country if the potential pro…t of a
single …rm is higher in the foreign country than in the home country– that is, if ¼¤u > ¼u. A
single upstream …rm located in the home country produces a quantity xu = xhou +xfou . It sells a
quantity xhou in the home country at price pu and a quantity xfou =¿ in the foreign country at price
¿pu: Its cost of production is (xhou +xfou )wL. If the upstream …rm were to locate in the foreign
country, it could always chose to sell the same quantities at the same price and thus generate
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the same revenue. In order to sell xhou units of the good in the home country, an upstream
…rm located in the foreign country must produce a quantity ¿xhou . Its cost of production is
therefore (¿xhou + xfou =¿)w¤L: Since xfou wL > (xfou =¿)w¤L always holds; a su¢cient condition for
the cost to be higher in the home country than in the foreign country (and hence for ¼¤u > ¼u)
is xhou wL > ¿xhou w¤L , which is equivalent to
ªL =
wL
w¤L
> ¿:
The proposition follows.
Similarly, suppose that ªaH and ¦a characterize, respectively, the autarkic equilibrium rela-
tive skilled wage and the relative intermediate goods price.
Proposition 5.5. For any trade-cost levels such that (ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ > ¿; downstream …rms
have an incentive to locate in the home country.
Proof. Using an argument similar to the previous one, it follows that ¼d > ¼¤d if (xhod +
xfod )w
¤(1¡¹)
H P
¤¹
u > (xhod =¿ + ¿x
fo
d )w
1¡¹
H P
¹
u : A su¢cient condition for the cost to be higher in the
foreign than in the home country is that
ª¹¡1H ¦¡¹ =
Ã
wH
w¤H
!¹¡1 µ Pu
P ¤u
¶¡¹
> ¿:
The proposition follows.
In fact, simulations of the model (see Section 7) show that (a) if ªaL > ¿ then the relative
number of upstream …rms decreases compared to its autarkic level (i.e., Nu < Nau) and (b) if
(ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ > ¿ then the relative number of downstream …rms increases compared to its
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autarkic level (i.e., Nd > Nad ): This is true for a full range of parameters.
15 Thus, at low trade
costs, vertical specialization occurs. Consequences on wages are similar to the free-trade case.
That is, wages converge across countries, and both the wage premium and the within-industry
share of skilled workers rise in the home country compared to their autarkic levels.
6. The Agglomeration Equilibrium: Intermediate Trade Costs
At some intermediate level of trade costs, an agglomeration process may occur. It is im-
portantly to note that, when the relative labor endowments (skilled vs. unskilled) di¤er across
countries– that is, when countries are asymmetric– one may determine in which country the ag-
glomeration takes place. The rationale runs as follows. Agglomeration is caused by the vertical
link between upstream and downstream …rms. If the use of intermediate goods by downstream
…rms is important (i.e., if ¹ is high enough), then the vertical linkages overcome the forces of
factor prices and hence upstream and downstream …rms …nd it pro…table to locate in the same
location. If countries di¤er in their relative (home to foreign) endowment of unskilled labor, the
agglomeration takes place in the foreign country. A decrease in trade costs encourages upstream
…rms to locate in the foreign country, where the autarkic unskilled wage is relatively cheaper. If
the cost linkage overcomes the relatively high wages of skilled labor in the foreign country, then
downstream …rms …nd it pro…table to locate in the foreign country as well. Demand and cost
linkages reinforce each other and their combination leads to a circular causality that entails the
clustering of production activity in that country. The process is similar (but reversed) when the
agglomeration takes place in the home country.
In this section, I aim to examine the agglomeration process and identify some elements that
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may help us understand its mechanism. Although the dimensionality of the model limits the
extent of analytical results, I identify conditions under which agglomeration takes place. In the
next section, simulations of the model corroborate the existence of agglomeration. I also address
broader issues concerning its impact on wages, prices and trade volume.
Suppose there exists a range of trade costs at which the relative number of upstream …rms
decreases compared to its autarkic level, so that Nu < N au: Within this range of ¿; if the relative
number of downstream …rms also decreases compared to autarky then there is agglomeration
in the foreign country. In fact, as shown by Proposition 6.1, the more upstream …rms in the
foreign country, the stronger the forces attracting downstream …rms to that country. The more
downstream …rms in the foreign country, the stronger the demand linkage attracting even more
upstream …rms there. When demand and cost linkages reinforce each other, agglomeration may
occur.
Proposition 6.1. The lower the relative number of upstream …rms, the stronger the cost linkage
(i.e., the greater the incentive to agglomerate in the foreign country).
Proof. The relative price of intermediate goods is increasing in the relative number of
upstream …rms, that is, @¦=@Nu < 0: See Appendix 2.
Downstream …rms decide to locate in the foreign country if the potential pro…t of a single
…rm is higher in the foreign country than in the home country. Using an argument similar to
that used in the preceding case, ¼¤d > ¼d if (xhod +x
fo
d )w
1¡¹
H P¹u > (¿xhod +x
fo
d =¿)w
¤(1¡¹)
H P ¤¹u : At
Nu = 0, i.e., at the highest relative upstream goods price; see Proposition 6.1; the inequality
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ª1¡¹H ¦¹xhod > ¿xhod does not hold. Therefore, a necessary condition for ¼¤d > ¼d is
ª¹¡1H ¦¡¹ =
Ã
wH
w¤H
!¹¡1 µ Pu
P ¤u
¶¡¹
< ¿:
Thus (ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ < ¿ is a necessary condition for any one downstream …rm to wish
to locate in the foreign country. Because (ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ is decreasing in ¹, it follows that,
the higher the share of intermediate goods used in …nal goods production (i.e., the stronger the
linkages between …rms), the less restrictive the necessary condition. Note that, if a downstream
…rm …nds an incentive to locate in the foreign country, then it must be true that the cost linkage
is stronger than the factor price force.
Proposition 6.2. If the necessary condition for a single downstream …rm to locate in the foreign
country holds, then the cost linkage is stronger than the factor price force.
Proof. The necessary condition for ¼¤d > ¼d is ª
1¡¹
H ¦
¹ > 1=¿: Then, when ª1¡¹H ¦¹ > 1,
the necessary condition holds. It is equivalent to
µ Pu
P¤u
¶¹
>
µw¤H
wH
¶1¡¹
: (6.1)
The relative price of the intermediate goods (up to the share at which intermediate goods enter
…nal goods production) is greater than the relative skilled wage (up to the share at which skilled
labor enters …nal goods production):
Three conditions make inequality (6.1) more likely to hold: strong vertical linkages (i.e., high
¹); high relative unskilled endowment, because it reinforce the cost linkage; and low relative
skilled endowment, because it lessens the forces of factor prices.
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In fact, if ªaL > ¿ > (ª
a
H)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ ; then (a) the relative number of upstream …rms de-
creases compared to its autarkic level and (b) the necessary condition for the relative number
of downstream …rms to decrease compared to its autarkic level holds.16 Agglomeration in the
foreign country is a most likely outcome. Agglomeration in the home country may be an equi-
librium if the cost linkage is weaker than the relative factor price force (i.e., if ª¹¡1H > ¦¹).
At high relative skilled endowment, this is likely to happen. In fact, as seen in the previous
section, if (ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ > ¿; then a single downstream …rm …nds it pro…table to locate in the
home country and the relative number of downstream …rms increases compared to its autarkic
level.17 A necessary condition for an upstream …rm to wish to relocate in the home country is
that ¿ > ªaL: Thus, if (ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ > ¿ > ªaL, agglomeration in the home country is likely
to occur.
7. Simulations and Discussion
Simulations of the model are plotted in Figures 1 and Figure 2. The …gures sketch the
relationship between the share of …rms in home (i.e., the ratio of the number of type-h …rms
locating in the home country to the total number of type-h …rms, where h = upstream or
downstream) and the level of trade costs. They provide an overview of the equilibrium structures
of production and wages as trade costs vary. In Figure 2, countries di¤er in their unskilled labor
endowment whereas in Figure 3, they di¤er in their skilled labor endowment.18 Note that in the
presented simulations, small di¤erences in labor endowments are considered. Larger di¤erences
would obviously enhance agglomeration and vertical specialization.
Simulations con…rm the results discussed in previous sections. At high levels of trade costs,
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both countries produce both goods and the share of …rms in each country does not vary much.
This is the quasi-autarkic situation. For a range of intermediate trade costs, the share of both
types of …rms increases in one country compared to their autarkic levels: an agglomeration
process takes place. If countries di¤er in unskilled labor endowments, the industrial activity
clusters in the foreign country Figure 2 (a); if countries di¤er in skilled labor endowments, it
clusters in the home country Figure 3 (a). At low levels of trade costs, location decisions depend
on comparative advantage. The share of downstream …rms in the home country increases com-
pared to its autarkic level, whereas the share of upstream …rms decreases. Vertical specialization
occurs.
In order to look more closely at the impact of globalization on inequality, we refer to Figures
2 (b) and Figure 3 (b), which sketch the relationship between the wage premium and the level
of trade costs. Wages converge from their autarkic level to their level with low trade costs.
In the (home) country with abundant skilled labor, the wage premium is higher under vertical
specialization than under any other situation ( i.e., autarky or agglomeration). Furthermore, the
number of home-country upstream …rms is lower under vertical specialization than under au-
tarky. Vertical specialization induces a within-industry shift away from unskilled workers, which
occurs whereas the wage premium increases. Hence, in empirical studies, this potential cause of
within-industry increase in inequality should be carefully disentangled from the observationally
equivalent counterpart, skilled-biased technological progress.
Consequences of agglomeration on wage premia are more complex. Because the skilled labor
endowment is fully used in the downstream sector, factor market competition is …ercer in this
sector than in the upstream one. Hence, the impact of a change in the number of downstream
…rms on skilled wages tends to be greater than the impact of a change in the number of up-
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stream …rms on unskilled wage. Also, …rms that relocate against their comparative advantage
do so in smaller numbers. If the agglomeration takes place in the home country, then relo-
cation of downstream …rms is driven by the cost linkage and by di¤erences in relative factor
prices (caused by the di¤erence between countries in relative endowments); however relocation
of upstream …rms is driven by the demand linkage but contraindicated by di¤erences in relative
factor prices. In equilibrium, proportionally more downstream …rms than upstream …rms relo-
cate their production from the foreign country to the home country. Undoubtedly, then, changes
in skilled wages dominate changes in unskilled wages. Home relative wages are more unequal
under agglomeration than under autarky whereas foreign relative wages are more equal. This
situation is depicted in Figure 3 (b). If the agglomeration takes place in the foreign country
the– even though upstream …rms relocate in greater proportion than downstream …rms– skilled
wages seem to be more a¤ected than unskilled wages by the change in relative demand for labor.
The wage premium increases in the foreign country and decreases in the home country compared
to autarkic levels (see Figure 2 (b)).19 This last point opens up the discussion to an interesting
question that is beyond the scope of this paper but would deserve to be addressed in further
research: Could agglomeration of the economic activity in unskilled-abundant countries have
caused at least part of the observed increase in their wage premium?
Finally, trade in intermediate goods and agglomeration may help us understand some other
empirical facts that standard trade theory fails to explain. Actually, along with the argument
that trade could not explain the joint occurrence of an increased wage premium and an increased
within–industry skilled-unskilled employment ratio, at least two other observations reinforce our
skepticism concerning the role of trade in explaining the rise of wage premia in industrialized
countries. First, most authors have argued that the volume of trade with low-wage countries is
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too small to generate the observed increase in wage inequality. Second, though we should observe
a rise in the price of skilled-labor–intensive products relative to those of unskilled-labor–intensive
ones (as predicted by the factor proportions model), empirical studies of international price data
have failed to …nd any clear evidence of such a change in relative prices.
Concerning the volume of trade, note that this paper mostly captures intraindustry trade,
which features “north–north” trade. This can be seen through the similation, which exibit rel-
ative abundance of factors close to one. As we have seen, although countries may exhibit close
labor pro…les, agglomeration and vertical specialization occur at some levels of trade costs and
with demonstrated e¤ects on wage premia. Hence, whereas volumes of trade with emerging
countries might be low, trade with other industrialized countries that are not much di¤erent in
labor endowments (nor hence in labor prices) may explain increased wage premium.20 Thus,
small di¤erences in relative labor endowments may help shed some light on within-Europe in-
traindustry trade and patterns of inequality (e.g., relocation of …rms across Europe could at least
partially explain why France and the U.K. have seen a greater increase in employment/wage
inequality than Ireland or Spain, which are relatively more unskilled-abundant).21 Concerning
relative prices, if there is demand for both domestic and foreign made products, then decreased
trade costs tend to reduce the index price of both skilled-intensive and unskilled-intensive goods
(more varieties produced, lower cost of imports). Moreover, prices of skilled-intensive goods
(downstream goods prices) tend to capture the decrease in input prices and hence to decrease
further. Thus, the e¤ect of trade liberalization on the relative prices of skilled- to unskilled-
intensive goods is ambiguous. The ratio may remain unchanged or even decrease with trade
costs, as assessed by some empirical studies.22
30
8. Calibrations of the Model
Using U.S. and Mexican data, I calibrate the model in order to evaluate the potential impact of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the U.S. wage premium. This paper
posits that a decrease in trade costs should lead to relocation of unskilled-intensive stages of
production from the United States to Mexico, which should in turn contribute to the observed
increase in the U.S. wage premium. Although NAFTA was enacted in 1994, U.S.– Mexico trade
started to be liberalized a few years earlier. I will therefore estimate parameters for the year
1990 and analyze the e¤ect of a decrease in trade costs on the 1990–2000 increase in the U.S.
wage premium.
Calibration of themodel requires the following parameters: the share ± of labor in agricultural
production, the share ° of manufactured goods in consumption, the share ¹ of manufacturing
intermediate goods used as inputs in manufacturing goods production, and the elasticity ¾ of
substitution between varieties in consumer preferences. Using data from the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis on value added and wage bill per industry, I …nd that the share of labor in
agricultural production is 0.3. Since preferences are presumed to be Cobb–Douglas, the share
of manufactured goods in consumption is equivalent to the share of income spent on manu-
factured goods. Since my model includes agricultural and manufacturing sectors only, workers
are employed in either sector and consume both goods. Hence, total income must equate total
consumption and ° is de…ned as the share of manufactured goods’ consumption in total (i.e.,
manufacturing and agricultural) consumption. Using sectoral data on consumption from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, I …nd that ° = 0:7: Similarly, input–output data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis shows that manufactures and value added enter …nal goods’ production
with similar shares, ¹ = 0:55: There is a range of estimates for ¾; but recent trade studies …nd
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values in the neighbourhood of 5 to 6 for the elasticity of import demand with respect to price.
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000) provide a survey of these studies and use such an estimate. I follow
their choice and employ ¾ = 5 in the calibration.
Data on labor relative endowments of skilled versus unskilled labor are needed for both
countries. Population data for the United States and Mexico come from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Data on skill composition of the labor force are from Barro and Lee (2000). Skilled labor
corresponds to the fraction of the labor force over 25 years of age that has completed some
tertiary education. Tari¤s between Mexico and the United States have decreased by about 10%
over the 1990–2000 period. Although there are no data (to my knowledge) available on non-tari¤
barriers (NTBs) and transportation costs for U.S.–Mexico trade, I value the former at 13% and
the latter at 20% prior to NAFTA. These estimates correspond to the average NTBs and freight
costs found by Harrigan (1993) for U.S. bilateral trade.
Assuming that NAFTA eliminates tari¤s and NTBs and that freight costs decrease by half,
trade costs fall from 43% to 10% over the period.23 I therefore investigate the impact of a
33% decrease in trade cost on the wage premium. For the sake of robustness, I also consider a
smaller decrease in trade costs: assuming that freight costs do not fall and that there are still
some tari¤s and NTBs, trade costs decrease by about 20%. Calibration of the model shows that
such decreases in trade costs induce an increase in the skilled-abundant country’s wage premium
of 5% and 3.2%, respectively. As mentioned previously, the U.S. wage premium– calculated as
the ratio of average annual wage of college to high-school graduates– rose by about 15% in the
1980s (see Bound and Johnson 1992). Harrigan (1998), using a similar measure of relative wage,
shows that the increasing trend in the U.S. relative wage persisted over the 1990–1995 period.
He …nds that the U.S. wage premium rose by about 8% between 1990 and 1995. Since there is
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some evidence that the increase in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers lessens
at the end of the considered decade, I assume that the wage premium increases by 10%–15% in
the 1990s.
Thus, a 33% (20%) decrease in trade costs would explain 35% (22%) of a 15% increase in the
U.S. wage premium; it would explain 52% (33%) of a 10% increase in the U.S. wage premium.24
The high level of these contributions is partly explained by the extreme structure of the model
(i.e., the fact that sectors are labor-speci…c). However, these results con…rm the positive and
signi…cant impact of trade, through vertical specialization, in explaining the increase in the wage
premium of relatively skilled-abundant countries. Because it increased vertical specialization
across countries, NAFTA has indeed contributed to the observed increase in skilled–unskilled
worker inequality in the United States.
9. Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical contribution to the analysis of the …rm’s location and its
impact on labor prices. The main result establishes that if …rms are vertically linked and if
stages of production di¤er in labor factor intensity, then a decrease in trade cost implies the
joint occurrence of increased wage premium and within-industry skilled-unskilled ratio in skilled-
abundant countries. There is strong empirical evidence of this co-movement, yet traditional trade
theory o¤ers no explanation. By considering trade in intermediate goods as well as relocation
of …rms, this paper helps to reconcile facts and theory.
The vertical structure of production presented here corresponds more appropriately to some
sectors of the economy than others. It would therefore be interesting to identify these other
sectors, to investigate whether reallocation of stages of production across countries has occurred
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in them and to estimate the e¤ects of relocation on within-industry relative employment levels
and wages. Empirical work is in progress that aims to answer these questions by analyzing the
case of France. 25
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10. Appendices
10.1. Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Because preferences are Cobb–Douglas in the agricultural good
and in the aggregate of downstream goods, a share 1 ¡ ° of income is spent on the former;
this implies that CA = (1 ¡ °)(wL¹L +wHH + r). Similarly, in the foreign country we have
C¤A = (1 ¡ °)(w¤L¹L¤ +w¤HH¤ + r¤). Supply of the agricultural good is such that xA = L±A
at home and x¤A = L¤±A (recall that, by assumption, R = R¤ and R is normalized to 1). The
market-clearing condition implies that
Ã
wL¹L +wHH + r
w¤L¹L¤ +w¤HH
¤+ r¤
!
=
Ã
LA
L¤A
!±
: (10.1)
In equilibrium, the price and marginal productivity of factors are equal, so
w
w¤ =
µL¤A
LA
¶1¡±
,
v
v¤ =
H¤
H
L
L¤
µL¤A
LA
¶1¡±
; and
r
r¤ =
Ã
LA
L¤A
!±
:
Substituting in (10.1) and then rearranging yields
w¤L
·µL¤A
LA
¶
¹L ¡ ¹L¤
¸
+ v¤H¤
24µ L
L¤
¶± ÃLA
L¤A
!¡±
¡ 1
35 = 0:
This equality holds if and only if at least one of the following three conditions is true.
(i) (L¤A=LA) ¹L ¡ ¹L¤ = 0 and (L=L¤)± (LA=L¤A)¡±¡ 1 = 0; which implies that LA=¹L¤A = ¹L=¹L¤
and LA=L¤A = L=L¤:
(ii) (L¤A=LA) ¹L ¡ ¹L¤ < 0 and (L=L¤)± (LA=L¤A)¡± ¡ 1 > 0; which implies that (a) LA=L¤A >
¹L=L¤ and (b) LA=¹L¤A < L=L¤: Inequality (b) is equivalent to LA=L¤A < (¹L ¡ LA)=( ¹L¤ ¡ L¤A):
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Solving yields LA=L¤A < ¹L=¹L¤ which contradicts inequality (a).
(iii) (L¤A=LA)¹L ¡ ¹L¤ > 0 and (L=L¤)± (LA=L¤A)¡± ¡ 1 < 0; which implies that (c), LA=L¤A <
¹L=¹L¤ >and (d) LA=L¤A > L=L¤: Inequality (d) is equivalent to L¤=L¤A > ( ¹L ¡ LA)=(¹L¤ ¡ L¤A):
Solving yields LA=L¤A > ¹L=¹L¤which contradicts the …rst inequality (c).
Thus, condition (i) must be true. Hence LA=L¤A = ¹L=¹L¤ = L=L¤.
10.2. Appendix 2
Proof of proposition 6.1 (continued).
@g = (@g=@Nu)@Nu +(@g=@W)(@W=@Nu)@Nu;
@g=@Nu = g¾=
£
(1 ¡¾)(NuW1¡¾¿1¡¾+ 1)2¤ W 1¡¾(1 ¡ ¿2(1¡¾)) < 0;
@g=@W = g¾=
£
(1 ¡ ¾)(NuW1¡¾¿1¡¾ +1)2¤ [NuW¡¾(1 ¡ ¾)(1 ¡ ¿2(1¡¾)) > 0;
j @g=@Nu j>j (@g=@W )(@W=@Nu) j if W > Nu(1 ¡¾) @W=@Nu which is always satis…ed.
Hence @g=@Nu < 0; @g=@W > 0; @W=@Nu > 0 and j @g=@Nu j>j (@g=@W )(@W=@Nu)j
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Notes
1See Acemoglu (2000) for a survey.
2Hecksher–Ohlin theory (and more speci…cally the Stolper–Samuelson theorem) predicts that trade with low-
wage countries raises the relative price of the skilled-intensive good. It implies an increase in the relative price of
skilled labor and consequently an increase in the ratio of unskilled to skilled workers within industries.
3Berman et al. (1994) and Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) for the U.S.; Machin et al. (1996) for the U.K.,
Sweden, and Denmark; and Strauss-Kahn (2001) for France.
4Feenstra (1998), Campa and Goldberg (1997), Hummels et al. (1998, 1999), and Strauss-Kahn (2001) docu-
ment that vertical specialization has increased.
5These stages refer either to di¤erent links of the production chain (e.g., the production of tires, engines, and
electronic components in the automobile industry) or to di¤erent varieties at a similar stage of production (e.g.,
the production of di¤erent kinds of tires in the automobile industry).
6See Krugman and Venables (1995).
7For simplicity, we assume that upstream …rms do not sell to consumers. Allowing such sales would weaken
the agglomeration forces but would not change the qualitative results.
8The notion of ”intermediate good” must be understood in its most general conception. A good produced
in the upstream sector– which acquires most of its value added in the downstream sector (where the managing,
marketing, designing, and wholesaleing activities are processed)– is assumed to be an intermediate good for the
downstream …rm. This situation justi…es a framework in which the upstream sector is unskilled-labor–intensive
and the downstream sector is skilled-labor–intensive. I chose to present a simple model where sectors are labor-
speci…c because it allows me to obtain some analytical results. Considering relative labor intensity with the
upstream sector being relatively unskilled-labor–intensive and the downstream sector being relatively skilled-
labor–intensive would not modify the qualitative results. Agglomeration and vertical specialization would occur
but with less magnitude (i.e., the number of …rms that relocate would be smaller).
9For simplicity, we assume that ® and ¯ are the same in both industries. Allowing them to di¤er changes the
scale of production but does not a¤ect the results qualitatively.
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10See equations (2.3) and (2.4) and recall that ¯ = ®(¾ ¡ 1):
11Cui is the aggregate of di¤erentiated upstream goods demanded by downstream …rm i. In equilibrium, pu is
constant over varieties. A representative downstream …rm therefore demands the same quantity of each variety k.
Hence in autarky Cui = n¾=(¾¡1)u ciuk, where c
i
uk, is the demand of downstream …rm i for a variety k of the domestic
upstream good. Also cuk = ndciuk; where cuk is the total demand for variety k. In equilibrium, cuk = xuk = 1
and thus, Cui = n
¾=(¾¡1)
u (1=nd):
12A scenario in which the number of upstream …rms increases in both the home and the foreign country (though
it rises in greater proportion in the latter) is a potential free-trade equilibrium. This would occur if total demand
for upstream goods increases dramatically from its autarkic to its free-trade level. However, simulations of the
model rule out such possibilities, and this is true for a full range of parameters and endowment levels.
13Although the proof is tied up to the sector-speci…c structure of the model, the proposition holds in a more
general framework. Suppose that both downstream and upstream …rms use both types of labor, with downstream
…rms being skilled-labor–intensive and upstream …rms being unskilled-labor–intensive. If the number of home up-
stream …rms is lower under free trade than under autarky, then the within-industry skilled–unskilled employment
ratio is higher under vertical specializatin than under autarky .
14The Hecksher–Ohlin factor price equalization theorem posits that relative factor prices should converge across
countries (i.e., the wage premium should increase in the skilled-abundant country and decrease in the unskilled-
abundant country).
15Attempts have been made to prove these results, but the dimensionality of the model renders the usual
analytical techniques of limited value. The equilibrium equations contain a large number of simultaneously
determined endogenous variables, and simulations of the model (with careful sensibility analysis) are often required
to support results.
16Recall that simulations imply that if ªaL > ¿ then Nu < Nau :
17Recall that simulations imply that if (ªaH)
¹¡1 (¦a)¡¹ > ¿ then Nd > Nad :
18Parameter values for the simulation represented are as follows: ¹ = 0:7; ¾ = 4; ± = 0:6; and ° = 0:55. In
Figure 2 L=L
¤
= 0:9 and ¹H= ¹H¤ = 1 ; in Figure 3 L=L
¤
= 1 and ¹H= ¹H¤ = 1.1. These parameters are consistent
38
with those used by Amiti (2001) and by Krugman and Venables (1995).
19This is true for a large range of parameters and endowments.
20In a recent paper, Davis and Weinstein (2001) con…rm the role of relative factor endowments in explaining
north–north trade.
21For more evidence on inequality and education attainment see OECD (1998).
22See for example, Lawrence and Slaughter (1993).
23Freight costs decrease because of simpli…ed transaction and communication costs and because of increased
trade and hence competition in shipping.
24Note that higher values of ¹ and ¾ lead to higher contributions.
25See Strauss-Kahn (2001).
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Figure 1: Trend in employment and wages of skilled versus unskilled workers. 
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Figure 2: Equilibrium share of home-country firms and relative wages when 
9.0/ * =LL   and  1/ * =HH . 
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Figure 3: Equilibrium share of home-country firms and relative wages when 
1/ * =LL   and  1.1/ * =HH . 
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